#### Macro II

Professor Griffy

UAlbany

Spring 2025

#### Introduction

- Today: Market structure
- Complete markets:
  - Arrow-Debreu structure (time-0 contingent claims);
  - Arrow securities (sequentially traded one-period claims).
- Exam: 3/27.
- Homework 3 due next Thursday.
- ▶ Homework 4 due Tuesday before exam (3/25).

#### Complete markets

- Individuals in the economy have access to a comprehensive set of risk-sharing contracts:
  - They can contract to insure against any event or sequence of events.
  - ▶ They write these contracts with other agents in the economy.
- ▶ Will lead to
  - Perfect risk sharing
  - i.e., representative agent.

### Complete markets

- Define unconditional probability of sequence of shocks  $s^t = [s_0, s_1, ..., s_t]$  to be  $\pi_t(s^t)$ .
- Assume there are i = 1, ..., I consumers, each of whom receives a stochastic endowment  $y_t^i(s^t)$ .
- They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

These contracts yield expected lifetime utility, where  $\lim_{s\to 0} u_i'(c) = +\infty$ 

### Complete markets

They purchase a consumption plan that stipulates consumption for any history of shocks and yields:

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$


And are subject to a feasibility constraint:

$$\sum_{i} c_t^i(s^t) \leq \sum_{i} y_t^i(s^t) \ \forall \ t, \ s^t$$

- ▶ These contracts determine how to split resources at each t.
- i.e., they insure individuals ex-ante against income risk.

## Contingent claims trading structure


Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.



- ► Each node represents a possible sequence of shocks.
- ➤ A consumption plan would specify consumption at each node at each time.

# Sequential trading structure

Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s<sup>t</sup>.



At t = 2, contract for two possible realizations.

### Trading structure

- Arrow-Debreu structure: contract at time t = 0 on every possible sequence of shocks.
- Arrow securities: re-contract at ever t given the history of shocks s<sup>t</sup>.
- ▶ Do these trading structure yield the same equilibrium allocation? Yes.
- Important property:
  - Under either structure, allocations are a function of the aggregate state only (& initial conditions).
  - ▶ i.e., allocation depends only on  $\sum_{i=1}^{l} y_t^i(s^t)$
- Leads to representative agent structure.

#### Planner's Problem

- First, we will find the Pareto optimal allocation.
- ▶ i.e., the allocation from solving the Social Planner's problem:

$$\max_{c^i} W = \sum_{i=1}^I \lambda_i U_i(c^i)$$

- where  $\lambda_i$  is a "Pareto weight," i.e., how much Planner values individual i relative to others.
- Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_i \beta^t u_i(c_t^i) \pi_t(s^t) + \theta_t(s^t) \sum_{i=1}^{I} [y_t^i(s^t) - c_t^i(s^t)] \}$$

• i.e., maximize weighted expected utility subject to the feasibility constraint (multiplier  $\theta$ )

#### Planner's Problem

Constrained maximization:

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \{ \sum_{i=1}^{I} \lambda_i \beta^t u_i(c_t^i) \pi_t(s^t) + \theta_t(s^t) \sum_{i=1}^{I} [y_t^i(s^t) - c_t^i(s^t)] \}$$

FOC in  $c_t^i$ :

$$\beta^t u_i'(c_t^i(s^t)) \pi_t(s^t) = \lambda_i^{-1} \theta_t(s^t)$$

How is this allocated across consumers?

$$\frac{u_i'(c_t^i(s^t))}{u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))} = \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_i} 
\to c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1 u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$$

▶ Often, assume  $\lambda_i = \lambda_1 \forall i \rightarrow c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$ 

#### Planner's Problem

Allocation:

$$c_t^i(s^t) = u_i'^{-1}(\lambda_i^{-1}\lambda_1u_1'(c_t^1(s^t)))$$

Sub into resource constraint:

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}^{\prime - 1} (\lambda_{i}^{-1} \lambda_{1} u_{1}^{\prime} (c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

▶ i.e., the resource allocation depends only on aggregate endowment and weights of each consumer.

#### Decentralized allocations

We know that the optimal allocation is given by

$$\sum_{i} u_{i}'^{-1}(\lambda_{i}^{-1}\lambda_{1}u_{1}'(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))) = \sum_{i} y_{t}^{i}(s^{t})$$

Can we achieve the same allocation under different trading regimes?

Specifically, does the decentralized economy achieve the same allocation?

## Consumer's problem

► Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_t^0(s^t)c_t^i(s^t)\leq\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\sum_{s^t}q_t^0(s^t)y_t^i(s^t)$$

## Consumer's problem

► Yields the following:

$$\beta^{t} u'_{i}[c_{t}^{i}(s^{t})] \pi_{t}(s^{t}) = \mu_{i} q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})$$
$$\frac{u'_{i}(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t}))}{u'_{1}(c_{t}^{1}(s^{t}))} = \frac{\mu_{i}}{\mu_{1}}$$

which implies

$$\sum_i u_i'^{-1}(\mu_1^{-1}\mu_i u_1'(c_t^1(s^t))) = \sum_i y_t^i(s^t)$$

## Competitive Equilibrium

**Definition** A competitive equilibrium is a price system  $\{q_t^0(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and allocation  $\{c^{i*}\}_{i\in\mathcal{I}}$  such that

1. Given a price system, each individual  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  solves the following problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \{c_t^{i*}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty} &= \arg\max_{\{c_t^{i}(s^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u\Big(c_t^{i}(s^t)\Big) \pi_t(s^t) \\ & \text{s.t.} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^{i}(s^t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^{i}(s^t) \end{aligned}$$

2. On every history  $s^t$  at time t, market clears

$$\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}c_t^{i*}(s^t)=\sum_{i\in\mathcal{I}}y_t^i(s^t)$$

Rules out economies with externalities, incomplete markets, etc.

#### First Welfare Theorem

► First welfare theorem: Let c be a competitive equilibrium allocation. Then c is pareto efficient.

▶ Equivalence: Competitive equilibrium is a specific Pareto optimal allocation in which  $\lambda_i = \mu_i^{-1}$ .

## Sequential trading

- Now, we will consider an economy with sequential trades.
- ▶ i.e., each period agents meet and trade state-contingent bonds
- Recall from asset pricing:

$$p_{t} = \beta E_{t} \left( \frac{u'(d_{t+1})}{u'(d_{t})} (p_{t+1} + d_{t+1}) \right)$$

- where the expectation is over realizations of  $s_{t+1}$ , which determines  $d_{t+1}$ .
- Price is determined by payout of asset across all different realizations.
- i.e., asset that provides good return across all realizations: expensive.

# Market clearing

- Recall from asset pricing that the net bond position of the economy equaled zero.
- i.e.,  $\sum_{i} b_{t+1}^{i} = 0$ .
- Same in this context.
- Some are borrowing and some are saving (in principle, if there were heterogeneity).
- This must net to zero.

#### Restriction: No Ponzi Schemes

Must ensure that agents never take out too much debt.

Natural debt limit:

$$A_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{ au=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^ au \mid s^t} q_ au^t(s^ au) y_ au^i(s^ au)$$

This is the amount that the agent could borrow and still commit to repay.

Rules out Ponzi schemes.

## Sequential problem

Consumer's problem: maximize

$$U_i(c^i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t} \beta^t u_i [c_t^i(s^t)] \pi_t(s^t)$$

subject to

$$egin{aligned} c_t^i + \sum_{s^{t+1}} Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t) & \leq y_t^i(s^t) + a_t^i(s^t) \ -t + 1^i(s^{t+1}) & \geq -A_{t+1}^i(s^{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

where  $Q_t$  is a pricing kernel: price of one unit of consumption given realization  $s_{t+1}$  and history  $s^t$ .

## Sequential allocation

Solving the previous problem yields the following Euler Equation:

$$Q_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = \beta \left( \frac{u'(c_{t+1}^{i}(s^{t+1}))}{u'(c_{t}^{i}(s^{t}))} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t}) \right)$$

▶ Same as the asset pricing specification from earlier.

▶ Taking the expectation of this expression across all possible realizations of  $s^{t+1}$  yields the price, Q.

## Sequential Trading - Competitive Equilibrium

**Definition** A competitive equilibrium is a price system  $\left\{ \left\{Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty}, \text{ an allocation} \\ \left\{ \left\{\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t), \; \left\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \text{ an initial distribution of wealth} \\ \left\{a_0^i(s_0) = 0\right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \text{ and a collection of natural borrowing limits} \\ \left\{ \left\{A_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t)\right\}_{s_{t+1} \in S}\right\}_{t=0}^{\infty} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \text{ such that}$ 

- 1. Given a price system, an initial distribution of wealth, and a collection of natural borrowing limits, each individual  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  solves the workers problem.
- 2. On every history  $s^t$  at time t, markets clear.

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} c_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} y_t^i(s^t) \qquad \text{(Commodity market clearing)}$$
 
$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} a_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) = 0 \forall \ s_{t+1} \in S \qquad \text{(Asset market clearing)}$$

### Equivalence of allocations

- Is this allocation also a time-0 trading allocation?
- Yes. Suppose that the pricing kernel takes the following form

$$egin{aligned} q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1}) &= Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t)q_t^0(s^t) \ rac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} &= Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ That is, the price of 1 unit of consumption in period t+1 is the same regardless of whether you purchased that consumption last period or in period 0.
- ▶ When this holds, sequential allocation coincides with time-0 trading allocation, subject to initial distribution.
- ► Formal proof (check on your own): ► formal proof

#### Conclusion

► Midterm next Thursday (after break)!

► Check website for homework.

## Equivalence of allocations

$$Q_{t}(s_{t+1}|s^{t}) = \frac{q_{t+1}^{0}(s^{t+1})}{q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})} \Rightarrow \beta \frac{u'\left(\tilde{c}_{t+1}^{i}(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(\tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t})\right)} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t})$$
$$= \beta \frac{u'\left(c_{t+1}^{i*}(s^{t+1})\right)}{u'\left(c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t})\right)} \pi_{t}(s^{t+1}|s^{t})$$

◆ back

### Guess for portfolio

On every history  $s^t$  at time t,

$$\widetilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t) = \sum_{ au=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^ au \mid (s_{t+1},s^t)} rac{q_ au^0(s^ au)}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big( c_ au^{i*}(s^ au) - y_ au^i(s^ au) \Big) orall \; s_{t+1} \in S_{t+1}^i(s^ au)$$

Value of this portfolio expressed in terms of the date t, history  $s^t$ consumption good is  $\sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) =$ 

$$\begin{split} &= \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | (s_{t+1}, s^t)} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) Q_t(s_{t+1} | s^t) \\ &= \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | (s_{t+1}, s^t)} \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \frac{q_{t+1}^0(s^{t+1})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \\ &= \sum_{\tau = t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau} | s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_t^0(s^t)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) \end{split}$$

# Verify portfolio

On history 
$$s^0 = s_0$$
 at time  $t = 0$ , assume that  $a_0^i(s_0) = 0$ . Then 
$$\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) + \sum_{s_1 \in S} \tilde{a}_1^i(s_1, s_0) Q_1(s_1|s_0) = y_0^i(s_0) + 0$$
 
$$\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_0^0(s_0)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = y_0^i(s_0) + 0$$
 
$$q_0^0(s_0) c_0^{i*}(s_0) + \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau}) \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = q_0^0(s_0) y_0^i(s_0)$$
 
$$(\text{if } \tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) = c_0^{i*}(s_0) )$$
 
$$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_t^0(s^t) y_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s_0} q_t^0(s^t) c_t^{i*}(s^t)$$

Therefore, given  $\tilde{c}_0^i(s_0) = c_0^{i*}(s_0)$ , portfolio  $\{\tilde{a}_1^i(s_1,s_0)\}_{s_1 \in S}$  is affordable.

## Verify portfolio

On history 
$$s^t$$
 at time  $t$ , assume that 
$$\tilde{a}_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big). \text{ Then }$$
 
$$\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) + \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1}, s^t) Q_t(s_{t+1}|s^t) = y_t^i(s^t)$$
 
$$+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big)$$
 
$$\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_t^i(s^{\tau}) \Big) = y_t^i(s^t)$$
 
$$+ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^t} \frac{q_{\tau}^0(s^{\tau})}{q_{\tau}^0(s^t)} \Big( c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^i(s^{\tau}) \Big)$$

◆ back

# Verify portfolio

On history  $s^t$  at time t, assume that

$$\tilde{a}_t^i(s^t) = \sum_{ au=t}^\infty \ \sum_{s^ au|s^t} rac{q_0^0(s^ au)}{q_0^0(s^t)} \Big( c_ au^{i*}(s^ au) - y_ au^i(s^ au) \Big).$$
 Then

$$\begin{split} q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}) + \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{t}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) &= q_{t}^{0}(s^{t})y_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) \\ + \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) & \text{ (if } \tilde{c}_{t}^{i}(s^{t}) = c_{t}^{i*}(s^{t}) \text{ )} \\ \to \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) &= \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s^{\tau}|s^{t}} q_{\tau}^{0}(s^{\tau}) \Big(c_{\tau}^{i*}(s^{\tau}) - y_{\tau}^{i}(s^{\tau})\Big) \end{split}$$

Therefore, given  $\tilde{c}_t^i(s^t) = c_t^{i*}(s^t)$ , portfolio  $\{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^i(s_{t+1},s^t)\}_{s_{t+1}\in S}$  is affordable.

◆ back

#### Conclusion

► Exam: 3/27.

► Homework 3 due next Thursday.

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